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AND THE BAR IN
IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL
CHANGE
HUBERT
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American political process, the roles of our
courts and lawyers have always been of interest to me. I have had
the good fortune to be able to view the American lawmaking process
from several vantage points: as Vice President, a United States Senator,
Mayor of Minneapolis, and professor of political science. The added
dimension of having seen how our system of lawmaking works as both
a lawmaker and a law enforcer has proved invaluable. Thus, although I
am not a lawyer by profession, I have always taken a keen interest in
the interplay between the branches of our Government and the citizens
it represents. I hope to discuss in this short paper what I believe is one
of the more important elements of this process, namely, the function of
our courts and our lawyers in effecting social change through law.
A STUDENT OF THE

The role of our courts does not raise a new question, of course. The
Framers of our Constitution faced it when they laid the groundwork of
our system of Government. These were men extremely wary of decision
making by non-elected officials, and therefore very sensitive to the role
the courts should play in the American lawmaking process. But although
the question may be as old as our system itself, it appears to have assumed its more modern framework with the landmark Supreme Court
decision in Marbury v. Madison,' where the doctrine of judicial review,

States Senator from Minnesota.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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now so vital a part of our judicial heritage,
was first announced.
Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of statutes is a prime example of
what some have referred to as 'judicial lawmaking.' Such judicial lawmaking is not,
however, limited to constitutional cases.
The classic definition of the judge's rolethat they speak the law but do not make
it-is really a myth. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes more accurately put it, "[Jiudges
do and must legislate." '2 This lawmaking
occurs in all areas of the law-the development of the doctrine of products liability
is judicial lawmaking of a type similar
to the constitutional rejection of the "separate but equal" 3 doctrine in Brown v.
Board of Education.4
The real questions which must be faced,
therefore, are the nature and proper limits
of the lawmaking in which courts do engage. 5 These are the questions over which
jurists, legislators and others have argued
over the years. 6 Recently, these issues

Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896),
overruled, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
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again have become the subject of controversy, perhaps in large part because of the
changes in the membership of our highest
tribunal and the commitment of the present
Administration to a "strict construction"
of the Constitution.
Notable spokesmen for the Administration have, during the past year, questioned
the role of the lawyer in our society (especially the 'new breed' of lawyers), as well
as the proper role of litigation and judicial
action as they affect social matters. It is,
of course, true, as Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger noted in his address at the dedication of the new Law Center at Georgetown
University in Washington, D.C., 7 that the
courts have often provided a "slow, painful
and often clumsy instrument of progress .
"..
8 But in 1972, this is not as
factually accurate a statement as it would
have been twenty, or even ten years ago.
Moreover, and more important, even if
true, this statement should not be viewed
as a valid basis for arguing that courts and
lawyers should operate in a vacuum, unmindful of the social implications of what
they do.

2

483 (1954).
4

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

5 See, e.g., Friedman, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 MOD. L.
REV.

593

(1966).

The bar of this country is one of its most
important assets. Lawyers play a vital part
in the smooth working of our democratic
process; it is their advocacy and counseling
which makes the law meaningful to our

Friedman asserts that we

should pay attention not to "the stale controversy
over whether judges make law [but] to the much

more complex and controversial question of the
limits of judicial lawmaking." Id. at 595.
6,Compare, e.g., the late Justice Harlan's comments in the reapportionment case of Westberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 48 (1964):
What is done today saps the political process. The promise of judicial intervention in

matters of this sort cannot but encourage

popular inertia in efforts for political reform
through the political process, with the inevitable result that the process itself is weakened.
with Judge Wright's remarks, quoted at text
accompanying note 15 infra.
7 Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
at the Ceremonies Dedicating the new Law
Center, Georgetown University, Sept. 17, 1971.
8 Id. at 12.
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citizens. Recent years have seen the development of an even more socially conscious
bar, concerned, both in their individual and
professional capacities, about the serious
problems this country faces. Whether they
are called the "new lawyers," or "activist
lawyers," (and "new" does not necessarily
refer only to the young), they are fighting
in our courts legal battles designed to protect the environment, the consumer, the
poor, racial minorities-in short, to effect
social change through law.
Before even discussing what the lawyers
and the courts are doing today, it should be
helpful to take a brief look at their activities for the past twenty or so years.
Brown v. Board of Education was clearly
a major event as far as the role of our
courts in our society is concerned. It may
have been the first real dent in the historical
truth that courts are "slow, clumsy and
painful" instruments of progress. At the
time Brown was decided, fifty-eight years
had gone by since the Louisiana "separate
but equal" railway accommodation statute
had been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Many of us then in Congress had long been
urging meaningful civil rights legislation,
but despite such efforts, Congress had not
yet enacted any civil rights legislation overturning the separate but equal doctrine. At
the state level, suffice it to say that it was
the segregationist school legislation of
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware which came before the Supreme Court
in Brown. Yet, a unanimous Court rejected
the established rule that separate but equal
accommodations for black and white were
constitutionally permissible, and took the
first major governmental step in the still
continuing fight for racial equality.

The Court clearly played the major role
in the early years of the civil rights effort.
Brown, at first, was not even fully supported by the lower federal courts, and
numerous decisions on extensions of the
Brown rationale to situations other than
railway accommodations proved to be necessary, 10 despite the fact that the implications of the Brown decision were clear.
Congress did not enact a major civil
rights bill until 1964,11 ten years after
Brown was decided. Yet it seems inconceivable that any man of good conscience
still thinks that what existed before 1954
should have been left untouched. Public
support for and legislative inactivity concerning racial discrimination did not, and
still does not, make such discrimination
proper.
The marked social change spearheaded
by the judiciary in the civil rights areas is
evident. However, there are equally good

In 1955, the Supreme Court ruled that there
be a "prompt and reasonable start toward full
compliance" with their decision on school desegregation. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 295 (1955). During the mid- and late
1950's, many states tried delaying tactics or
complied with the 1954 decision only in a
9

token manner. Note, The Federal Courts and
integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status
of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
193, 206 (1964).
10 See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61

(1963)
(courtroom seating); State Athletic
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (segregated athletic events); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (bus segregation); Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal
golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath
houses).

I" The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447 (1970).

18 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1972

examples of how the judiciary has taken
action when no action was forthcoming
from the other branches of Government.
For example, until 1967, only one welfare
action had been adjudicated in the federal
courts, 12 despite the fact that the welfare
laws were not responding well to welfare
realities. Today, as one author notes, "the
most obvious new element in the development of welfare 'rules' is the role of the
courts."' 3 The examples do not stop here.
Baker v. Carr' sparked a revolution in the
area of reapportionment, and the modifications made to the law of criminal procedure
in the past twenty years are too well known
to require citation.

It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case this court must act in an area
so alien to its expertise. It would be far
better indeed for these great social and
political problems to be resolved in the
political arena by other branches of government. But these are social and political
problems which seem at times to defy such
resolution. In such situations, under our
system, the judiciary must bear a hand and
accept its responsibility to assist in the
solution where constitutional rights hang
in the balance. So it was in Brown v. Board
of Education, Boiling v. Sharpe, and Baker
v. Carr. So it is in the South where federal
courts are making brave attempts to implement the mandate of Brown. So it is
here. 15

What these examples show is that law
does not operate in a vacuum, but is inextricably intertwined with pressing social
issues. In each area mentioned above,
reform was surely necessary, and had been
necessary for a long time before the judiciary acted. When the courts acted, it was
not for the purpose of usurping power, but
with the recognition that legislative action
was more desirable, and urgently needed.
Perhaps this spirit was best described by
United States Court of Appeals Judge J.
Skelly Wright in a case involving racial
discrimination in the operation of the District of Columbia public school system:

The "other branches of government" did
respond to pleas of the type quoted above
and to the realities of the United States in
the last third of the twentieth century. The
Great Society program resulted in the enactment of more meaningful and comprehensive social legislation than at any
previous time in our nation's history. The
"most far reaching civil rights measure of
the century"' 6 was enacted in 1964, and
subsequent years saw further legislative
progress in this area. The Economic Opportunity Act of 196417 established Head
Start, The Job Corps, and VISTA, to name
just a few of the important attacks on
poverty during this period. The model
cities program and related measures began
to concentrate on the problems of our
cities, and housing problems were faced

12 Barret, The New
Role of the Courts in
Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970 DUKE L.J.
1.
13 Id. at 6. The primary role of the courts in
this area might be the judicial dissolution of the
right-privilege distinction. Id. See also Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1968).
14

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

15 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517

(D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291 (c)).
16 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Special Report
730 (Apr. 5, 1968).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1970).
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with the establishment of HUD in 1965.
Later years saw increasing emphasis upon
the problems of the consumer, with the
enactment of various measures to safeguard
him from unsafe products and less than
honest advertising and lending practices.
The end of the 1960's and the beginning
of the 1970's have witnessed a concerted
legislative attack on environmental problems of all types.
The response of our political branches
of government clearly have lessened the
burden assumed by our courts in earlier
years. During the 1950's and early 1960's,
the courts were the primary progressive
force in many areas of social concern. They
were faced with problems where little or no
legislative guidance was available, and
where, more often than not, judicial
"rules" were either nonexistent or seriously
in need of revision. Novel cases were presented to the courts by a concerned bar,
and the courts responded to the challenge.
But the shift to positive legislation has
resulted in a significant change. Today,
federal administrative agencies are directly
or indirectly involved in most areas of
social concern. At the least, the enabling
legislation of these agencies requires protection of the "public interest." And, of
course, there are now many specific pieces
of protective legislation aimed at resolving
pressing social problems.
The thrust of socially oriented litigation
has, in turn, shifted. It is now aimed at
broadening the concept of the public
interest or making specific legislation applicable to a greater variety of situations.
This has involved a greater effort on the
part of the lawyer and the concerned
citizens he represents. It has been the

creative litigation brought by these lawyers
and citizens which appears to be the primary force in the social changes now being
made through law.
It is understandable that the first steps in
this transformation were cases brought to
establish the right of the citizen to represent
the public interest. To the layman, this
might seem a rather strange thing to have
to do, but the strictures of the judicial doctrine of "standing," coupled with the fact
that the federal agencies were charged with
the duty to represent the public interest,
had for years severely limited the ability
of members of the public to challenge
agency action absent a financial interest in
the outcome of such action.' 8
Then, in 1965, a group of conservationists sought to intervene in a Federal Power
Commission proceeding to challenge the
effects of a proposed hydroelectric facility
would have on recreational facilities around
New York's Storm King Mountain.' 9 The
challenge was based on aesthetic considerations, not financial ones. The Power
Commission challenged the standing of the
petitioners to obtain judicial review. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled against the FPC, and
took a major step by rejecting the theory
that a personal economic interest was a
20
prerequisite to standing.

18 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.

447 (1923).
19 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1965).
20 Id. at 616. The Court stated:
In order to insure that the Federal Power
Commission will adequately protect the public
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A year later, the federal appeals court
for the District of Columbia upheld the
standing of members of the listening public
to challenge a broadcast license renewal
application before the Federal Communications Commission. 21 Then, in 1968, the
Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen22 significantly modified a position it had taken
more than 40 years earlier in upholding
the right of a taxpayer to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal program giving aid to parochial schools.2 3 The standing
test today has evolved to one of (1) actual
injury by a petitioner, whose interest is
(2) "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute
24
or constitutional guarantee in question.

interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational aspects of power development,
those who by their activities and conduct have
exhibited a special interest in such areas, must
be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties under the Federal Power Act.
• . . We hold that the Federal Power Act
gives petitioners a legal right to protect their
special interests.
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2.3 In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), the Supreme Court had denied the standing of a taxpayer to challenge a similar federal
appropriation. See also Note, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: The Concept of
Personal State, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 570
(1971); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
32 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970); Henkin, The
Supreme Court 1967 Term-Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 75 (1968).
24 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), decided
the same day, upheld the standing of tenant
farmers to challenge the validity of a regulation
by the Secretary of Agriculture. The regulation
challenged was 31 Fed. Reg. 2815, 7 C.F.R.
21
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This broadening of the concept of standing has resulted in increased access to the
courts for citizen groups to challenge proposed agency actions arguably not in
accord with the agency's statutory commitment to the public interest. Welfare recipients have challenged the Social Security
Act's Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program, 25 and conservationists
have gone to court to challenge federally
supported road construction. 26 A citizen
group prompted the full judicial exposition
on the scope of the National Environmental
2
Policy Act of 19692 in the Calvert Cliffs s
case, and conservationists had standing to
challenge the recent thermonuclear test on
29
Amchitka Island in the Aleutians
The citizen actions mentioned above are
only a few illustrations of the creative
litigation brought by citizens and their
"new" lawyers to protect the public interest by spurring administrative action, or
when that fails, by enlisting the aid of the
courts. A last example should suffice. For
the past several years, the problem of
recycling of solid waste has been debated in
both Houses of Congress. Yet, meaningful
specific legislation has been slow in coming. Nevertheless, the National Environ-

7093 (1966), amending 20 Fed. Reg. 6512, first
issued in 1955. Issuance of such regulation was
authorized under the Food and Agriculture Act
of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (1970).
25 National Welfare Rights Organizations v.
Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26 Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
27 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
28 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2.) Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, Civ. Act. No. 1346-71 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
5, 1971).

IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL CHANGE

mental Policy Act of 1969 is already
the law, and section 102 requires every
federal agency to
(C) include in every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation and
other major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action. 30
In 1970, 1971, and 1972, the nation's
railroads applied for increased rail freight
rates for certain materials, including recyclable iron, steel, textile, paper and
glass scrap. A group of George Washington
University law students, calling themselves
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures ("SCRAP"), intervened in
these actions, alleging in part that the
failure to consider the environmental
effects of such a rate increase constituted
a violation of NEPA. If the students are
successful, it will mean that protective environmental legislation will have been
applied to economic acts, something that
has not occurred before.
Actions of the type briefly described
above have helped make the people of our
country more aware of the serious problems that face us, and in many instances

30 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)

(1970).

have done something about those problems.
And this has, for the most part, been
brought about not by asking the courts to
make new laws, but to enforce those laws
designed to protect the public which have
already been enacted by the Congress and
state legislatures. It is here that the contribution of our new lawyers has been the
greatest, and where the opportunity for
continuing measures in the public interest
is available to those lawyers willing to meet
the challenge.
Our system of government is designed
for the benefit of those it governs. Almost
two hundred years have shown us that this
is not always as simple a matter as it
sounds. Effective good government demands a continuing effort by all branches
of government and active participation by
the people for whose benefit the structure
has been created. Law, of course, is part
of that structure, and to be meaningful,
must respond to the realities and problems
which continually confront us. Recent
years have witnessed a judiciary, a bar, and
a citizenry attempting to make the law
respond. In so doing, they have used our
system in a positive way; they have tried,
and often succeeded, to implement social
change through law, without violence or
upheaval. The fact that the courts now are
less painful and clumsy, and that our bar
is more aware of matters of importance to
society should not be cause for concern.
Indeed, it should encourage us all.

